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The difference arises mainly from the left-wing populist vote, whose average is % in Timbro () and % in the PopuList dataset (see. Play Kof wing games online, the most played games are The King of Fighters Wing , The King of Fighters Wing EX, KOF Wing MIME type: Image/png. Download this PNG (KB) Fatal Fury: King of Fighters The King of Fighters XIII Joe Higashi Capcom vs. SNK 2 Capcom vs.

The role of economic uncertainty in the rise of EU populism | SpringerLink – Create an account or sign in to comment

Public Choice, 1—2 , — Informational autocrats. Public Choice, 3—4 , — Google Scholar Margalit, Y. Globalization and taxation: Theory and evidence. Comparing support for left-wing and right-wing populist parties, we observe that the WUI has a larger impact on right-wing votes a 1. Jurado, K.


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Regarding additional new controls, first, we focus on economic freedom to capture the impact of institutional quality on populist support. Second, following Kriesi , we enter the human capital index because populist voting behavior could be associated with a lack of education. Third, we add measures of globalization as measured by indices of economic globalization and overall globalization because, according to prior literature, globalization is the leading determinant of populist support owing to middle-class welfare losses.

Fourth, we enter subsidies and transfers, since governments can increase public spending and wealth transfers during periods of greater economic uncertainty. Such policies may affect support for populist parties. Fifth, we include the foreign population and asylum applications to capture the impact of immigration on populist voting behavior. Finally, we control for market income inequality and redistribution indices, as previous studies have observed that populist support is associated with economic inequality and a lack of redistributive policies.

In each case, the findings confirm the baseline results. Economic uncertainty continues to have statistically significant and positive effects on all measures of populist support despite the inclusion of additional controls.

Additionally, Online Appendix Table 9 reports the findings of a sensitivity analysis that excludes outliers. Outliers are dropped from the WUI and the three measures of the share of populist votes.

Following Fang et al. The baseline findings are also robust to the exclusion of outliers. Finally, we substitute the share of populist votes in PopuList 2.

In brief, the sensitivity analysis results reinforce the baseline results, supporting the hypothesis that economic uncertainty promotes populist attitudes in EU countries. In this section, to provide specific examples of what the data capture, we discuss some anecdotal evidence in which countries and economic uncertainty are positively correlated with the share of votes for populist parties. Following the — GFC, Hungary experienced a severe financial and fiscal crisis, which led to a significant increase in economic uncertainty.

Similarly, following the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in , Poland experienced a significant rise in economic uncertainty. Moreover, Kukiz 15 an authoritarian right-wing populist party focusing on Polish nationalism obtained 8. Another compelling piece of anecdotal evidence is the case of Greece.

As a result, economic uncertainty in Greece rose significantly in In the snap parliamentary elections of , Syriza — Synaspismos Rizospastikis Aristeras an authoritarian left-wing populist party focusing on anti-globalism emerged victorious with Overall, the three anecdotal examples indicate a positive correlation between economic uncertainty and the vote share of populist movements.

Our finding that economic uncertainty increases populist support is consistent with the results of other recent contributions to the literature. Guriev observes that economic indicators unemployment, inequality, and trade shocks are important determinants of populist support. Funke et al. Algan et al. Guiso et al. Finally, Pastor and Veronesi show that greater income inequality, financial development stock market capitalization to gross domestic product , and trade deficits increase populist support.

This paper examines the effects of economic uncertainty shocks on populist voting behavior in a panel dataset of 24 EU countries. Using data from to , we examine the drivers of the shares of total, right-wing, and left-wing populist votes. We rely on a new indicator of economic uncertainty, the World Uncertainty Index WUI , to measure economic uncertainty shocks. To check the robustness of our findings, we examine potential endogeneity issues, reverse causality, and omitted variable bias, and we exclude outliers.

Our main results remain consistent under those robustness analyses. The findings of our paper demonstrate that economic uncertainty boosts support for populist parties. Populist politicians also emphasize greater economic uncertainty, especially in the wake of the — Global Financial Crisis GFC. Other economic factors beyond uncertainty alone help to explain the trends in populist politics. As exemplified by the case of France’s National Front FN , many right-wing populist parties underwent a programmatic shift during the — period, i.

That shift occurred in response to changes in the social base of right-wing populist parties, with increasing numbers of working-class and low-skilled workers in precarious jobs. It is essential to note that populist policies are not limited to populist parties, because mainstream parties also can implement populist policies. While our paper does not focus on that issue, future studies should examine the political characteristics of events rather than the classification of political parties.

As another possible research agenda, future studies should focus on the effects of trade policy uncertainty and COVIDrelated shocks on populist voting behavior. Additionally, little evidence has been reported in the empirical literature on the impact of economic uncertainty shocks on voter turnout rates. Finally, future papers could implement machine-learning techniques to determine whether indicators of economic uncertainty predict populist vote shares.

See Margalit b for a recent literature review of the definitions and causes of populism. Following the model of Berliant and Konishi , Kishishita also shows that greater uncertainty rather than risk is a leading driver of populist support. Other contributions to the literature have studied the impact of economic shocks on individual-level voting behavior e. However, most of those analyses have explored the impact of economic uncertainty shocks on political attitudes, without investigating actual voting behavior.

For more discussion, see Margalit b. Note that more economic uncertainty tends to reduce the rates of participation in elections Guiso et al. However, evidence on the impact of economic uncertainty shocks on turnout remains scarce. Following the previous literature e. However, some studies e. If the month of an election occurs in the second semester between July and December , then the data used are those for year t. Our main findings are robust to the consideration of those different model specifications.

Hence, we follow the fixed-effects IV estimation procedure. See the ivreg Stata package for details. For the other years, it is the average of all quarters. The countries include Austria — , Belgium — , Bulgaria — , Croatia — , the Czech Republic — , Denmark — , Finland — , France — , Germany — , Greece — , Hungary — , Ireland — , Italy — , Latvia — , Lithuania — , the Netherlands — , Poland — , Portugal — , Romania — , the Slovak Republic — , Slovenia — , Spain — , Sweden — , and the United Kingdom — Unfortunately, no populist votes or WUIs are reported for Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg, or Malta; therefore, we exclude them from the empirical analysis.

LT as left-wing populism. However, Populist 2. Hans-Peter Martin. For other countries, see the user guides of these datasets. Comparable data from to confirm the argument. The average total populist vote is The difference arises mainly from the left-wing populist vote, whose average is 6. The correlation between right-wing populist voting measures is 0. The correlation between total populist voting measures is 0. From to , the French Communist Party could not be labeled a populist party.

However, from to , it approached the Front de Gauche the Left Front. The Front de Gauche is a populist party; therefore, the French Communist party has been populist since A recent issue of The Independent Review contains a symposium on populism, emphasizing its many and varied definitions Colantone and Stanig ; Edwards ; Guriev and Treisman ; Margalit b.

Consistent with Ahir, Bloom and Furceri , we observe statistically significant correlations of variations in growth rates and unemployment rates with the WUI in our EU sample. Thus, the WUI is associated with changes in the economic environment across the business cycle. We also enter dummy variables identifying parliamentary systems, presidential systems, and election timing. The results are robust to the inclusion of those indicators.

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Populism as a problem of social integration. Comparative Political Studies, 53 7 , — Golder, M. Far-right parties in Europe. Annual Review of Political Science, 19 , — Gozgor, G. Robustness of the KOF index of economic globalisation. World Economy, 41 2 , — Economic uncertainty and fertility. Journal of Human Capital, 15 3 , — Democracy and growth: Evidence from a machine learning indicator. You also have the option to opt-out of these cookies.

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